

















The German Tribune

Hamburg, 21 June 1987
Twenty-sixth year - No. 1278 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

Reagan in Berlin — the challenge of freedom

DIE WELT

Today, 12 June, is a great day for divided Berlin and Germans in East and West: the day on which President Reagan, having pledged his country's honour and might to maintain the freedom and security of part of a longsuffering city, delivers to the world from the Brandenburg Gate his message of freedom.

In an interview with *Die Welt* on the eve of his visit President Reagan wished Berlin well and congratulated its people on their courage.

He also made the political intention that motivates him unmistakably clear. Disarmament is not just withdrawing missiles; it is linked with the just demand, strictly in keeping with human nature, for walls to be demolished and people to be enabled to cross borders to meet.

The warning from East Berlin that the President would be wise not to do anything provocative within sight of the Wall betrays a little of the East German leaders' fear of the Presidential visit.

It also, unintentionally, reveals a measure of awareness within the East German leadership that the natural urge of people to meet and come closer cannot be suppressed for ever.

Events over Whitsun, when East German police truncheon-charged crowds of East Berlin youngsters crowding by the Wall to hear a pop concert on the Western side, again proved the point.

The East German Communist Party has no justification, neither internal nor external, for the Wall. President Reagan, with the Wall as his backdrop, will recall what John F. Kennedy told hundreds of thousands of people in Berlin on 26 June 1963:

"The Wall is the most appalling and most striking demonstration of the failure of the communist system, an admission of defeat for the whole world to see."

Mr Gorbachov, who is seen here by so many people with blind faith, has no answer at the ready. The US President has made it clear that he sees the Wall as an acid test of the new man in Moscow.

His visit to Berlin is also a token of encouragement for the Germans themselves, whose heads and hearts are so often at odds.

It will show those who feel diffident about mentioning reunification and prefer to see it as a remote and unrealistic prospect that to demand reunification energetically — by all peaceful means — is neither wishful thinking nor an attempt to turn back the wheel of history.

Many Germans owe the American people a debt of gratitude for the generosity with which they came to their rescue. Part of Berlin owes its freedom to the resolute intervention of the United States.

Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly recalled the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift, particularly at a time when the United States has been under attack — and at times has posed problems for its friends in the world.

That alone would be reason enough for it to be humiliating and disgraceful if President Reagan's Berlin visit were *marred by unpleasant scenes.*

In an address at Harvard Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker thanked the American people for their disinterested help in the post-war period, a historic gesture rarely made by victors.

Marshall Aid helped part of the German people to get back on their feet economically and to regain their self-respect.

This farsighted helping hand was extended by the United States partly with a view to rebuilding a strong Europe and giving the Continent a fresh lease of life.



Firm friends on both sides of the Atlantic: Reagan and Weizsäcker in Berlin. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Stalin prevented Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia from accepting US aid. *He laid the foundations for the division* of Europe his successors went on to intensify.

But neither Stalin nor Khrushchev nor Brezhnev were able to put down the dream of freedom, and Gorbachov will not succeed in doing so either, as anyone who has ever visited Berlin will have sensed most strongly.

"For 26 years," Herr von Weizsäcker told Harvard graduates, "a wall has run through the middle of the city. It divides families and people with the same outlook and hopes, breathing the same air and sharing the same future.

"But it has failed in the aim it was built to accomplish: it has not succeeded in making people grow accustomed to division. Quite the reverse, it is daily proof that what was to be forgotten, the sense of belonging together, is still alive and well."

Konrad Adenauer accompanied President Kennedy to Berlin in 1963, and the octogenarian German Chancellor as*sured the young US President there* would never be a rift or division between Bonn and Washington.

Helmut Kohl is flying with President Reagan to Berlin, and his policy has underscored the assurance given to President Kennedy by Chancellor Adenauer.

Herr Kohl has been a staunch ally of the United States while at the same time *prevailing on Washington in his pursuit* of German interests. The quest for a common Western viewpoint in the disarmament debate is a case in point.

Close partnership with the United States is very much in Germany's own interest, but it is also based on the awareness that we share freedom and democracy on both sides of the Atlantic.

And that is precisely what the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union do not have in common.

Manfred Schell

(Die Welt, Bonn, 12 June 1987)

IN THIS ISSUE

Double zero a warning we must heed

International gatherings such as the Western economic summit in Venice, the Warsaw Pact summit in East Berlin and the Nato Foreign Ministers' conference in Reykjavik are held aplenty, yet if they are measured solely in terms of written results one is bound to wonder why.

*Seldom do they achieve more in writ*ing than a solemn affirmation of decisions already reached, and the meeting of Nato Foreign Ministers is unlikely to prove more productive.

The scene was already set for the double zero option, or withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe by both sides. It was set before the Reykjavik meeting, before the Venice summit — and not even Bonn's formal consent was really required.

No matter how vociferously the CDU and *CSU* might object, the double zero was a foregone conclusion once the Americans had decided to go ahead with it and the two European nuclear powers, Britain and France, had indicated that it was OK by them.

Basically, all that was left for the Bonn coalition was to arrive at a compromise formula that would allow it to *jump on the moving bandwaggon* in such a way that none of the three coalition parties stubbed their toes.

So the Reykjavik conference had little to do on this issue. It looks as though an arms control agreement may be reached that involves arms reduction and doesn't just specify ceilings.

After long years of East-West deadlock *that could easily have led to* a throwback to cold war, detente is again the keyword of relations between the blocs.

True, many obstacles remain to be cleared, and Nato Foreign Ministers will be pinpointing them in Reykjavik, but there is a general readiness to take Mr Gorbachov at his word.

Yet how far do people appreciate that it is little more than a first step and that this success cannot be the end but only the beginning of bids to make the world *safer?*

Worse still, missile reduction may lead to less security if it fails to mark a genuine starting-point toward peace with fewer weapons.

On this point at least, the sceptics are right. For the time being only an infinitesimal part of the nuclear arsenal is involved.

The threat posed by intercontinental ballistic missiles remains, and the zero option for missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,000km in Europe does *not include short-range missiles that* mainly threaten divided Germany.

And even if short-range missiles were also withdrawn that would still leave conventional armament with which, at

Continued on page 2

■ VENICE SUMMIT

All smiles for the camera but too much window-dressing and too few results

Seldom has a meeting of the West's "Super Seven" been held under such a cloud as the Venice economic summit of leading industrial countries.

Most Western leaders in Venice were more concerned with domestic worries than with the state of the world economy.

British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher didn't stay for even a full day, having to return to London on the eve of the general election.

President Mitterrand and Premier Chirac of France put in an appearance foreshadowed by the forthcoming election campaign in France.

Premier Nakasone of Japan no longer enjoys the confidence of his Liberal

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Democratic Party; his tax reform programme is felt to have been a failure.

President Reagan was keen to demonstrate leadership to the American public after the Irangate affair.

Even the summit host, Premier Fanfani of Italy, faces a general election and was unable to make commitments of any kind.

So there was little evidence on the lagoon island of San Giorgio Maggiore of the public spirit without which summit conferences remain gatherings devoid of content.

This was particularly true of the economic policy issues, which were pushed into the background and relegated to no more than mere set figures in accordance with the procedures of summit bureaucracy.

President Reagan was mainly concerned to demonstrate agreement with Europe and Japan on disarmament and to end the double zero dispute before the Reykjavik conference of Nato Foreign Ministers.

As the Bonn government had reluctantly come round to the US policy line, Mr Reagan was able to get the glossy all-smiles photograph he wanted in Venice.

But he failed in his bid to force the allies to share the burden of military safeguards for oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. All the summit produced on this issue was a feeble appeal to Iran and Iraq to end the Gulf War. No-one was surprised when, just before the conference began, the US delegation called on Germany to stimulate economic growth and employment.

No further mention was made of this issue at the summit talks and in the communiqué the question of whether one of the Seven has failed to fulfill his growth commitments was declared to be an issue for them all.

If, in the months to come, economic growth proves unsatisfactory, the Seven are to consider what can be done to make international economic development more consistent.

Taking the sharp edges off unfriendly demands levelled at the two "main mischief-makers" of the world economy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, by means of non-committal communiqué phrases has long been part of the summit ritual.

That will not stop the Americans from levelling fresh accusations at Tokyo and Bonn at the next opportunity.

Even so, Mr Nakasone succeeded in persuading the US President to halve to 17 per cent the punitive tariffs imposed on imported Japanese semiconductors.

The Japanese Premier prompted Mr Reagan to make this gesture by means of the special DM72bn budget drafted and approved in Tokyo just before the Venice summit.

Yet it would be premature to refer to a relaxation of tension in the Japanese-American trade war.

Venice more or less failed to arrive at new ideas, let alone prospective solutions, for the world's other economic woes: the new Gatt round, keeping markets open, the debt crisis and the dollar's decline.

Markets are not impressed by fine words and declarations of intent. Unless the new chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, has proved himself worthy of the confidence his predecessor Paul Volcker enjoyed, decisions reached by the "Super Seven" will carry little weight.

The Americans have also yet to show themselves capable of curbing the enormous US budget deficit, one of the main causes of international economic imbalance.

After this 13th Western economic summit even louder questions than usual will be asked as to the point of such gatherings. Do the meagre results warrant the enormous trouble and expense?

Is it worth imposing a state of siege on entire cities, with thousands of police, barriers and diversions that at times are a hindrance even for the summit participants themselves?

True, the seven main Western leaders meet for a few days (in Venice for only a few hours, as it happened) to confer and exchange opinions on the major issues of world affairs.

Close contact and efforts at better understanding doubtless count for something. But conferences lose their purpose when they are used mainly as window-dressing to impress domestic opinion.

Politicians can hold monologues at home, and as for the obligatory group photograph, that can surely be taken at less expense.

Signor Fanfani may have been a generous host and Palladio's artificial island an ideal conference venue, but all smiles in the lagoon is not enough. We can do without economic summits of merely tourist significance in future, thank you.

Peter Hort
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 11 June 1987)

Continued from page 1

the present level of advanced technology, devastating war could be waged, with Germany again the main battlefield in Europe.

Security, it will be seen, is not a matter of partial decisions; it consists of a network including a complex system of credible defence capability and effective diplomacy backed by this capability.

Comparisons will also need to bear politico-economic aspects in mind, and where they are concerned the West does not look in too bad shape at all.

The challenge the zero option poses is based on it compelling both sides to develop a future-orientated concept because a mere withdrawal of medium-range missiles might be hailed as a success in the short term but might, in the long term, lead to a fresh arms race — in both the short-range nuclear and the conventional sector.

What is more, in Nato it is now up to the Europeans to draw up and work on a plan for their own future.

Recent discussions have shown that the superpowers concentrate on their own interests if a choice is called for, especially when their allies merely lament their weakness and make no attempt whatever to develop their strength.

There can be no doubt that Nato is not alone in needing a plan by which arms reduction genuinely leads to greater security.

Western Europeans as a potential second pillar of Nato need a vision of their own, preferably one coordinated with the Americans, by which to look after their own affairs.

They must concentrate efforts not just economically but also politically and militarily. This particularly applies to France and Germany.

No-one can hope to create a favourable impression by lamenting about a growing tendency in Washington to go it alone when he has only himself to blame for his inability to remedy the situation in any way.

It is easy to claim a share in responsibility, but the claim must be accompanied by a desire for power. So the zero option, a success though it may be, is a warning to the Europeans and, hopefully, a warning they will heed.

Joachim Worthmann
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 12 June 1987)

Bonn can't be much help in the Gulf

President Reagan again called, at the Venice summit, on the Western industrial countries to join America in helping to protect freedom of shipping in the Persian Gulf.

Britain and France have long done so by stationing naval units there.

Japan, which is somewhat more heavily dependent than the Federal Republic of Germany on oil supplies from the Gulf, is said to be prepared to pay for US protection of oil tankers.

And the Germans? As a precaution, and without having been directly asked by President Reagan, Chancellor Kohl again made it clear in Venice that Bundesmarine warships could not be deployed in the Gulf for constitutional reasons.

Instead, he suggested, they might be used in the North Atlantic to provide further relief for the US Navy and protect sealinks between Europe and North America.

The question is: how realistic are such alternatives and how far do they accord with what America really wants, which is direct allied support in the Persian Gulf in its tough role as a world policeman?

Where the Germans are concerned, President Reagan and other leading members of the US government are holding their fire and not calling on Bonn to do more than the Chancellor would himself be prepared to offer.

Bonn government officials nonetheless well realise that US opinion would take very kindly to a German offer, if the Germans could only see their way to making it, of partial support in the shape of Bundesmarine ships in the Gulf.

German government experts rule out any such idea, although others, even including members of the Bonn Cabinet, feel it might work and are keenly aware of the goodwill it would generate in US public opinion.

A more realistic view, it is said in Bonn, is that German naval units might take over support roles from US warships mainly in the North Atlantic or the Mediterranean.

But the number of ships available imposes immediate limits on this idea. The Bundesmarine only has 16 destroyers and frigates, a third of which are older vessels suitable for little more than training use.

A further third is long in the tooth but fully operational and the remainder consists of up-to-the-minute 122 class frigates such as the *Bremen* with its helicopters and sea-to-sea missiles capable of hitting both ships and submarines.

What the 122 class lacks is an effective means of defence from air-to-ground (or sea) missiles such as the Exocets that knocked out the *USS Stark*.

Bremen class frigates would, in conjunction with long-range reconnaissance aircraft, be well suited to patrolling large areas of either the North Atlantic or the Med.

But as the Bundesmarine simply doesn't have them, it is not in a position to maintain a permanent German naval presence in either the Atlantic or the Mediterranean.


One possibility would be more frequent exercises with other allied navies.

In the North Atlantic Nato already has Stanavforlant as a standing combined naval force, while in the Med there is a standby force of ships from neighbouring Nato countries at the ready to support the US Sixth Fleet.

German ships could take part in this force's manoeuvres more often. But that will only be a realistic prospect once the Bundesmarine's modest hopes are fulfilled and two to four new frigates are commissioned.

Rüdiger Moniac
(Die Welt, Bonn, 10 June 1987)

The German Tribune
Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH, 3-4 Hartwicusstraße, D-2000 Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1, Telex: 02-14733
Editor-in-chief: Otto Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Simon Burnett. — Distribution manager: Georgine Picone
Advertising rates list No. 15
Annual subscription DM 45
Printed by CW Niemeyer-Druck, Hameln
Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc., 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011
Articles in THE GERMAN TRIBUNE are translated from the original text and published by agreement with leading newspapers in the Federal Republic of Germany.
In all correspondence please quote your subscription number which appears on the wrapper, between asterisks, above your address



■ BERLIN

Reagan visit highlights basics of division against Berlin Wall backdrop

This review of US-West German relations by Robert G. Livingston, head of the Institute for Contemporary German Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., appeared in the Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit* on the eve of President Reagan's visit to Berlin. Professor Livingston headed it "The Reaganites and A Favoured Ally." The German headline was "Urged to (Show) German Patriotism: Why (America's) Bonn Friends Confuse Washington."

DIE ZEIT

Berlin lends itself far better than did Bitburg, the scene of President Reagan's last visit to Germany, to the purposes of the present American administration.

The Brandenburg Gate and the Wall provide the President's television advisers and his speech writers with backdrops that symbolise clearly a distinction between democracy and communism, between freedom and oppression, that continues to be the main animating force of Reagan's foreign policy.

The administration particularly needs to make this distinction clear to Americans now, at a moment when, reversing course, it is pushing hard for a nuclear weapons agreement with the communist adversary, the Soviet Union.

It also must demonstrate that, although embattled at home, it still leads its allies overseas — whether toward an agreement with Moscow or in defence of Western positions in Berlin.

The conservative American President will very much want to have the conservative German *Bundeskanzler* at his side when he delivers his speech at the Wall to make these points for American television viewers.

A speech by the President in Berlin will recall the German-American struggle at the time of the Blockade and Airlift to resist Soviet pressure.

It will underscore for a generation that has forgotten how essential anti-communism once was as the bonding element between the West German and American governments that made it possible in the 1940s and 1950s for Truman and Eisenhower to gain Americans' assent for the most dramatic reversal of alliances in our history.

For two decades thereafter, no other country in Europe was regarded in Washington as so safely anti-communist as the Federal Republic.

This assumption among American policymakers continues determinative today in the White House, much more so than most Germans realise.

For that reason the Reagan administration has been willing to contain its exasperation with the Kohl government's hesitations about supporting the "double zero" INF solution which Washington favours.

There is even a sneaking admiration within the White House that the West Germans are displaying some backbone in the face of Soviet temptations.

Far more prevalent for the past five years, when conservative governments have been in power in Bonn and Washington, have been doubts among more conservative elements in the Reagan administration about the West Germans.

They arise out of a conviction that a conservative government in Bonn, the most pro-American ever in the Federal Republic, really could do more to resist the Soviet Union and its allies and surrogates throughout the world if only it would decide to do so.

Admiration for the Germans is higher in this than in any post-war American administration. That is why the disappointment, frustration and exasperation are greater when Bonn proves reluctant to support defence and economic policies that Reagan, Weinberger and Baker urge upon it.

Chalked up against Bonn by ideological conservatives close to the administration in the first instance is its supposed readiness to appease the Soviet Union, its scepticism about Reagan's cherished Strategic Defence Initiative, its hankering for "dialogue-as-an-end-in-itself" with Moscow and its allies and for some Reagan administration officials its ever-friendlier dealings with the German Democratic Republic.

The impossibility of counting on West German support for American policies and actions in the Near East has been a particular sore point. It is likely to be so again.

Bonn is adjudged "wimpish" by the administration hard-liners and its influential neo-conservative sympathisers such as Irving Kristol because it insists on limiting its Nato commitments narrowly to Western Europe rather than extending them to military operations in North Africa, the Persian Gulf or other regions of the Middle East that fall within the jurisdiction of an American military command situated in Stuttgart.

Particularly galling was Bonn's reluctance to facilitate American strikes against Libya. Washington's indignation at the Europeans' disinclination to help the American navy protect oil shipments passing through the Persian Gulf has so far focussed upon London and Tokyo, but Bonn will probably come in for a share of criticism soon as well.

"A greater military effort by Bonn is chiefly a matter of political will"

Washington's perennial demand that the West Germans make a greater military effort and contribute more to Western defence has taken on a new, sharper edge under the Reagan administration for two reasons.

First, Reagan's singular success in carrying out America's massive military build-up since 1980 tempts it to believe that the problem is chiefly one of political will. Were the West Germans as determined as Americans, then surely they could raise their defence spending.

The second reason goes to the heart of American conservative objections to the German economic system. Even close friends such as former ambassador Arthur Burns are critical of the social welfare system to which the Kohl government is as attached as any of its predecessors.

Burns and others blame it along with institutional rigidities for economic sluggishness and entrepreneurial enervation which prevent the Federal Republic from contributing in full measure to common Western objectives.

Conservative critics such as Melvyn Krauss of the Hoover Institution attack the German welfare state for slowing economic growth and thus limiting resources available for the armed forces and for creating a welfare "constituency" hostile to defence spending.

Until friction between Bonn and Washington arose during the past few months about an eventual American-Soviet INF agreement, the most public disagreements have been over economic policies.

It is ironic enough that a conservative American administration practises Keynesian economic policies and runs up gigantic deficits as a result; but it is doubly ironic that it has been urging like policies on Bonn.

Finance Minister Stoltenberg and *Bundesbank* President Pöhl have turned deaf ears to Secretary Baker's and Chairman Volcker's pleas for a more expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, thus displaying a conservatism in economic policy that went out of fashion in Washington soon after the Reagan administration gave up its 1980 campaign promise to balance the budget.

(It is not without irony either that on the issues of the need for economic stimulus and of the "double zero" INF solution, the Reagan administration finds itself aligned with the despised Social Democrats rather than the admired CDU/CSU.)

Stoltenberg's stubbornness exemplifies Bonn's greatest sin in the eyes of conservatives in Washington since Henry Kissinger: its refusal to take a broader, global view of its international responsibilities.

Encouraging the West Germans to do more in Europe and outside it — in support of policies conceived mainly in Washington of course — has always been characteristic of the Reagan administration.

Irving Kristol, in the early Reagan years, urged the West Germans, at an Adenauer Foundation meeting in Bonn, to develop a "healthy patriotism."

For a nationalistic administration in Washington, it is incomprehensible that the West Germans remain hesitant to assert themselves and their national identity today, so many years after World War II.

Memories of the Third Reich are today politically less relevant in the White House than admiration for the record of the *Wehrmacht*.

Among Reagan conservatives, accordingly, the reputation of the *Wehrmacht's* successor, the *Bundeswehr*, is high and the expectations of what it can do for Western defence higher still.

Professor Krauss and Patrick Buchanan, until recently public relations chief in Reagan's White House, would be willing to entrust it with nuclear weapons.

Because Americans' historical memories are so short, there is little understanding for the Federal Republic's self-limitations in the military field or for the political effects that a strengthened *Bundeswehr* might have upon the Federal Republic's neighbours.

Behind the views of conservative isolationists is the implicit but unexamined belief that the German army could easily take up the slack if America should withdraw forces from the European continent.

Acutely aware of West Germany's economic power and admiring of its military reputation, Reaganites are the more disappointed and perplexed when Bonn displays its customary caution, diffidence and self-restraint.

To what can such hesitation to exercise power, especially military power, be attributed, conservatives here ask themselves.

Their answers are twofold and they are related: the pervasive, sub-surface strength of the peace movement and yearnings for national unity, which seem to make Bonn avoid moves that might antagonise the Soviet Union and lead to confrontations with it.

It came as a great and unpleasant surprise to the anti-communist administration in Washington when the trusted Helmut Kohl, upon assuming power in 1982, continued the very same *Ostpolitik* that his mistrusted Social Democrat predecessor Willy Brandt had initiated.

Reaganites watch uneasily as Christian Democratic Premiers flock to meet with Honecker or as a Christian Democratic Governing Mayor of Berlin makes plain his wish to attend communist ceremonies in the eastern half of the city regardless of what the American ally might think.

"Uneasy fear of end to clear and comfortable East-West division, especially in Germany"

An inchoate unease exists among those in Reagan's Washington who work with the Germans, a feeling that even Christian Democratic friends cannot but help but abet a movement toward East-West reconciliation in Central Europe that is blurring and will soon perhaps eliminate that clear, comfortable division between West and East, democracy and communism, even where the distinction has been sharpest in the past, between the two Germanies.

Ronald Reagan's visit with Helmut Kohl in Berlin will be replete with anachronisms. It brings into focus the old anti-communist, missionary component of a conservative American government's foreign policy at a time when the German conservative parties seek more detente and reconciliation with the communist countries of the East.

It highlights too the dominance of America as the occupying power in the German capital and hence in West German affairs at a time when a German conservative government increasingly attaches importance to balancing the American alignment with Western European and East-West policy lines and to protecting its own interests against American economic demands.

German national feeling, as promoted by a CDU/CSU government, can hardly turn against a United States run by a conservative government as well disposed toward the Germans as Ronald Reagan's has usually been.

It will, however, surely develop against the Federal Republic's recent past of acquiescence in policies made in Washington.

Reaganites may urge a West German patriotism but are not likely to welcome the policies that it might engender.

Robert Gerald Livingston
(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 12 June 1987)

■ THE LAW

Aids poses legal teasers at Hamburg congress

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

Aids, a topic not originally on the agenda, turned out to have more legal complications than expected at the 44th German Lawyers' Congress in Hamburg.

The legal problems associated with the disease were outlined during a special platform debate on "Aids and the Law".

The 600 people in the audience expected an exchange of political and not just legal views.

One of the guest speakers on stage was Bavaria's Peter Gauweiler, whose tough line on Aids has already hit the headlines throughout Europe.

During the peaceful debate the often sharply contrasting opinions were moderately packaged. Yet the differences soon became clear.

The discussion centred on the efficacy of the Federal Epidemic Diseases Act and the acceptability of certain measures in terms of constitutional law.

When, for example, is a doctor allowed to carry out an Aids test and how far does his professional discretion go vis-à-vis the authorities with regard to the disclosure of information on the carriers of the Aids virus?

These questions touch on criminal law. Does the unintentional or deliberate transmission of Aids constitute a criminal offence, e.g. grievous and wilful bodily harm?

Other legal fields affected are penal administration, labour laws and insurance laws.

At the congress Gauweiler reiterated the tough stance adopted by Bavaria's *Land* government.

Government strategies on this issue, he claimed, had been based on "misjudgements" which should have been rectified at an earlier stage.

The protection of the healthy, he maintained, is a constitutional commitment.

Gauweiler tried to underpin his arguments by describing how the disease could spread.

"There are maybe thirty or forty or sixty HIV-positive prostitutes and they have more than one client a day.

"Just imagine what would happen if the authorities look on as they infect between 200 and 300 men each day.

And these men are promiscuous, otherwise they wouldn't go to a prostitute in the first place."

Gauweiler feels that measures on a voluntary basis are not enough.

Manfred Bruns, a public prosecutor at the Federal Supreme Court in Karlsruhe, feels that such descriptions of the situation reflect a basic philosophy of life rather than legal appropriateness and expedience.

Although arresting a prostitute outside a drug advice centre may represent an isolated success in the fight against Aids it probably deters thirty or forty other women and drug addicts from seeking advice and thus registering voluntarily.

What is more, Bruns pointed out that Aids has an extremely long incubation period, which can extend far beyond a period of ten years, and that a test carried out today is no safety guarantee as it may be irrelevant in a few years' time.

In addition, Bruns emphasised, the Epidemic Diseases Act with its general provisions, whose implementation is left up to the individual *Länder*, is also governed by the constitutional principle of finding measures which are appropriate.

Venereal diseases such a syphilis or gonorrhoea can be cured within a short space of time, whereas persons suffering from Aids have to live in lifelong isolation.

"Any compulsory measure against Aids victims means 'life'," Bruns explained.

Bruns, who warned against police-state methods, is convinced that Aids tests are only meaningful in specific instances, e.g. for blood donors and during pregnancies.

In his opinion, coercive measures destroy the voluntary nature of medical checks.

Other speakers regarded the demands for compulsory tests as inevitable in view of the fact that the disease was rapidly spreading in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Meinrad Koch from the Aids working party at the Bonn Health Ministry put the number of persons infected by the Aids virus at between 100,000 and 200,000.

It is still not clear, however, in how many cases the disease will break out or cause the death of persons infected, who can transmit the disease to other people at any time.

Forecasts range between forty and one hundred per cent.

The crucial question is, therefore, whether mass screening is an appropriate means of containing and eliminating the disease.

One advantage at least would be to put an end to "the discrimination of certain groups of people".

The legal experts at this discussion were clearly sceptical about the possibilities open to criminal law to combat this dangerous disease.

Volkmar Mehle, a lawyer from Bonn underlined the "considerable difficulties" the courts would have to prove anything in such cases.

If offences involving bodily harm or manslaughter were assumed, both the cause and the effect would have to be proven.

This is extremely difficult in the case of Aids.

The subjective intention would have to be examined in each individual case, for example, an infected man transmits the disease to a woman or vice versa.

How high should infected persons rate the risk of a once-only sexual act without the corresponding safety measures? Can a person expect to be infected after being "unfaithful" on just one occasion?

Supreme Court prosecutor Bruns concluded that criminal law cannot serve as a substitute for a more essential information campaign for Aids sufferers.

The statements made by the representatives of the medical profession during the discussion showed how assessments vary on the extent to which Aids has extended beyond the originally assumed risk groups.

The Hamburg virologist Rainer Laufs claimed that ninety per cent of the persons affected are homosexuals and drug addicts.

Wolfgang Stille, the head of a Frankfurt clinic, on the other hand, was convinced that the disease had already overlapped into other heterosexual groups, including a growing number of women.


Stille pointed out that, according to his findings, roughly forty per cent of the persons infected were seriously ill eight years after the infection.


"We should not forget that Aids is an extremely serious disease, which makes extreme demands on its sufferers and the health services over a period of many years," said Rainer Laufs.

The health service in New York, for example, was already stretched to its limits, he added.

Karsten Plog

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1 June 1987)





Judges are unhappy with computerised courts

By way of contrast to the German Lawyers Congress, which sets out to elaborate recommendations for the legislator every two years, this year's German Judges Congress in Hamburg took a self-critical look at the state of the judiciary.

Although there was no exaggerated self-indulgence there were no resolutions and no recommendations.

The judges appraised their role and function in a society marked by considerable conflict potential and a growing inclination to try and settle conflicts via legal action.

A society which takes everything to court need not be surprised if justice as a whole is neglected along the way.

A judge cannot be fast and thorough at the same time. This twofold demand the judges in Hamburg explained, is making their task more and more difficult.

Electronic data processing can only help to a limited extent.

Many judges expressed their desire for a return to the "old" system of a competent and trustworthy assistant.

Although more EDP may shorten the written grounds given by the court for their decisions the shortened version often takes more time to compile than the more long-winded one.

Many judges feel that the legislator should be doing more to help them.

In many cases the responsiblity for making decisions on controversial issues is passed on to the courts instead of drawing up corresponding laws.

The labour laws are a case in point.

In other fields new laws in Bonn are produced in abundance. Between 1950 and 1980, for example, tax laws were changed eighty times.

None of the judges attending the congress criticised the demand for a rejection of a special "supergrass" law for terrorists.

Substantial misgivings were also expressed by the judges and public prosecutors against the use of undercover

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■ EUROPE

Marshall aid: the trigger of recovery

As US Army chief of staff in World War II General George C. Marshall, 1880-1959, set great store by close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

With equal goodwill he tried after the war, as Secretary of State, to persuade Stalin to negotiate the terms of a peace treaty with Germany.

On his return from the April 1947 Moscow conference of Allied Foreign Ministers he was sobered and disappointed.

The Soviet Union, he said, had insisted on proposals that would have kept not just Germany but all Europe in hardship and misery, inevitably leading to dictatorship and unrest as a consequence.

A peace treaty with Germany alone held the key to security and prosperity in Europe. "The patient is dying," he drastically put it, "as the doctors consult."

He promptly entrusted the head of planning staff at the State Department, George F. Kennan, with drafting a plan to ensure the survival of a Europe in the doldrums.

Basing his remarks on this preliminary draft, Mr Marshall outlined the aid plan that bears his name at a graduation ceremony in Harvard on 5 June 1947, forty years ago.

The initial reaction was domestic misgiving. Many of the supplies he proposed shipping to Europe would then no longer be available in sufficient quantity in the United States, critics argued.

President Truman, a Democrat, had to enlist Republican support for the Foreign Aid Act (the Republicans commanded majorities in both Houses of Congress).

It was Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, an untiring supporter of the Marshall Plan, who made the breakthrough. In December 1947 Congress approved the $600m in immediate aid, part of the $17bn with which America was to bail Europe out over the next four years.

President Truman was keen to include the Soviet Union and other East European countries in the plan. Moscow was to be appeased after America had intervened in the Mediterranean to protect Greece and Turkey.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, the *nyet* man, ruled out the idea, saying Marshall Aid was offered on terms unacceptable for the Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia were interested in American backing. A conference was to be held in Paris on a joint reconstruction programme, but Belgrade and Warsaw cried off under Soviet pressure.

Foreign Minister Masaryk of Czechoslovakia was told by Stalin in Moscow that: "If you attend the meeting the Soviet Union will consider it a hostile act."

The division of Europe began to take firm shape. Yet George Marshall stuck to his guns. Europe was a heap of rubble. People were hungry. Raw materials and energy were lacking.

"The situation is," he said at Harvard, "that Europe's requirements of foreign food and other important goods will for the next three or four years be so much higher than its present ability to pay for them that substantial extra assistance will be needed if serious economic, social and political decline are not to set in."

He added, with a glance in Moscow's direction, that: "Our policy is not directed against a state or a doctrine but against hunger, poverty, despair and chaos."

America had no intention of treating the Europeans like children. "It would be neither fitting nor effective for the American government to unilaterally devise a programme laying down how Europe was to be put back on its feet.

"That is a task for the Europeans themselves. The initiative must, I feel, be taken by Europe. Our country's role must consist of friendly assistance in drawing up an aid programme for Europe and in then supporting such a programme insofar as we feel it is fitting to do so."

A few weeks later, on 12 July 1947, delegations from 16 European countries met to set up the Committee on European Economic Cooperation, later to become the OECD.

In September they presented the Secretary of State with an initial report on measures urgently in need of financial assistance. Between 1948 and 1952 the United States ploughed $13bn into the Marshall Plan, including $9bn in (non-refundable) grants.

America also sent over "first aid" shipments of food, seed, fuel and medical supplies — known as Garioa shipments — that mainly went to areas occupied by US forces.

In retrospect it is clear that Marshall Aid laid the groundwork for economic cooperation in Western Europe and with it for the European Economic Community. In West Germany, especially after the 1948 currency reform, Marshall Aid lit the blue touch paper. Without it what was later known as the "economic miracle" would not have been possible. Marshall's revolutionary concept of helping others to help themselves was fully vindicated. European recovery was so successful that the Marshall Plan was ended in 1951, a year earlier than planned. Its after-effects are felt to this day: The Federal Republic received Garioa shipments worth $1.7bn (paid for in local currency) and a further $1.3bn in Marshall Aid, of which only $1bn was to be repaid.

George C. Marshall (Photo: dpa)

Repayment was completed ahead of schedule in 1961. The remainining $2bn was used to set up the ERP special fund, run by the Bonn government.

Shipments of goods and supplies were paid for in dollars by the US government, while German importers paid in DM.

The DM balance accumulated was paid into a special fund from which long-term loans are made, at concessional rates, to German businessmen.

The Federal government has since boosted ERP revolving funds, which totalled DM15bn at the end of 1985.

They are now invested in, for instance, environmental protection pro-

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Containment and the Germans: East-West ties then and now

Frankfurter Allgemeine

What, Churchill asked in March 1945, will lie between the white snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover?

With two months to go to the end of the war in Europe Poland was already lost and the question was who who hold the rest of Europe, with Germany in its midst.

There were British diplomats who recalled at the time the 1815 Congress of Vienna, and Dr Kissinger later outlined, in A World Restored, how Britain's Foreign Secretary Castlereagh and the Austrian Chancellor Metternich did all they could first to defeat the French in joint harness with the Russians and then to join forces with the French against Russia so as to restore peace and a balance of power in Europe.

The peace that followed was the longest in history, lasting to all intents and purposes until 1914.

In 1945 Churchill, like the British 130 years earlier, went to the brink of war with Russia over Poland.

But Britain in 1945 was exhausted, France was half-beaten and Germany destroyed. There was no Congress of Vienna to come and a European system could no longer be reconstructed from the ruins of European history.

Would America redress the balance, providing the counterweight Europe no longer was?

As long as Roosevelt's America wanted One World and a condominium and planned to withdraw US forces from Europe Europe's fate seemed sealed. When President Truman ("I'm sick and tired of coddling the Russians!") set his cap at containment there were hopes of change. In the summer 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs* Mr X, a writer readily identified as George F. Kennan, head of planning at the State Department, outlined the policy that had been in the making since 1944 and has since formed the groundwork of transatlantic cooperation. Mr Kennan saw Soviet behaviour as three quarters Russian anxiety and aggression of old and one quarter Leninist missionary spirit. He concluded that: "The main element of any American policy toward the Soviet Union must be long-term and patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian strivings for expansion."

He didn't want America to become an international policeman but he ended with the comment that Americans must provide the moral and political leadership "history has evidently intended for them."

Containment began on the periphery, from Iran to Greece. In Central Europe the issue was whether all Germany was to go Soviet or half of Germany was to become part of the West.

Allied issues were (and still are) the shape Western Europe was to take and the world power role the United States was to play.The Marshall Plan was drawn up as the economic side of the answer, ending Europe's hopeless economic predicament.

The political side consisted of Western European integration and the rehabilitation of the Germans.

The military side came first and last: first in the form of nuclear power projection and last, after the Berlin crisis and the Korean War, in the form of US troops permanently stationed in Europe.

Is containment past history 40 years later? The Soviet Union shows promising signs of movement, but its aim and direction are incalculable and not, for the most part, subject to influence.

To believe that a Leninist renaissance will establish a realm of peace really calls for an act of faith.

America is reviewing its commitments overseas and keen to establish a safety distance between itself and the Soviet Union — and from Europe.

Is there any need, in the circumstances, for a new grand design? The old one was not so bad, and it is still capable of development.

In the North Atlantic pact the Western European Union could become — intellectually, technologically and politically — a mainstay of the "second pillar" the Americans both clamour for and call into question.

As part of the Single European Act security issues can be coordinated with foreign affairs. Franco-German conventional cooperation, like Anglo-French nuclear coordination as agreed in March, is aimed in the better direction.

More than ever, Europe needs to join forces in research, development and procurement and, as a mainspring of advanced technology and linchpin of transatlantic reinsurance, a space programme to complement America's.

Churchill's opening question is as topical today as it was over 40 years ago.

In Europe we have grown so accustomed to the effects of containment that its prerequisites are all too often ignored.

The Harmel Report, published 20 years ago, saw assured defence capability as the groundwork for lasting conflict management.

The causes of potential conflict still exist. Detente declined because of Western weakness, not because of the West's strength. Had it not been for containment of the Soviet Union there would not have been a free Europe after 1945.

Strategic stability remains the precondition for all creative East-West policy, including arms control and disarmament.

Churchill's question was asked at a time when the Germans counted for little.

The answer to it now and in the future is not just a matter for German interest; it is also one of German responsibility.

Michael Stürmer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 6 June 1987)

■ PENSIONS

Staff grow keener on company pensions as management enthusiasm wanes

Company pensions have been around for nearly 150 years. Companies began in the mid-19th century, says Mannheim university professor Eduard Gaugler, to make social security provisions for retired staff.

They were initially based on considerations of patriarchal welfare. The state pension fund was not established until 1889.

Company pensions have always been felt to be most important, the Schmalenbach Society, a management studies association named after economist Eugen Schmalenbach, was told in Düsseldorf.

They still are. Over 50 per cent of the work force feel this form of company perquisite is their most important personal social benefit.

Professor Gaugler estimates the total cost of company pension schemes, including reserve provisions, at DM23bn a year.

Pension commitments have a capital value of about DM250bn, or roughly the same as the nominal paid-up capital of all German stock companies.

Last year German firms paid out DM12bn in company pensions. In the next four years their annual outlay will increase by about 10 per cent.

But the number of industrial companies that have launched new pension schemes has been on the decline since 1981 and the annual outlay has evened out.



While staff are keener than ever on company pensions, companies seem to have grown less enthusiastic. They are probably deterred by increasing costs.

Joachim Funk, a director of Mannesmann, the Düsseldorf iron, steel and engineering group, says costs have increased by about 25 per cent.

Pensions are due at earlier ages, life expectancy (especially that of women) has increased and pensions have been steadily increased to keep up with living costs.

Then there are the compulsory contributions to the insurance scheme set up to cover the cost of pension schemes when companies go out of business. They all cost money.

So the general tenor at the Düsseldorf gathering of about 500 executives and economists was, understandably, that any form of index-linking must be scrapped as soon as possible (if not already abandoned).

"That," Herr Funk says, "is a conclusion we are bound to reach from practical experience with economic and legal framework conditions over the past 20 years."

Pension pledges pegged to the final salary are problematic. They can hardly be calculated in advance and little or no influence can be brought to bear on commitments a company will face for several decades to come.

Index-linked company pensions amount to a hedge against changes in the state pension scheme, with staff usually being paid a certain percentage of their last salary.

"But," Herr Funk adds, "the legal framework governing company pension schemes has been changed over the past 10 years, and pension pledges have also been affected by constant changes in social security provisions. "Company pension schemes that were in any way pegged to state pension arrangements have been particularly hard hit."

Hans Gert Woelke, labour director of Thyssen, another Ruhr steel company, agrees. Changes in the contributions ceiling to the state pension have effectively cut the state pension by 19 per cent since 1976.

This is a gap that index-linked company pension schemes have had to bridge. Pegged pensions can no longer be costed in advance.

Now contributions toward the health insurance scheme for pensioners are levied on company pensions, the better the company pension, the greater the deduction.

The result is an undesirable redistribution effect. Those who benefit most from these health insurance contributions are pensioners and, *indirectly*, their former employers who have little or nothing by way of company pensions.

The cost of administering company pension schemes is heavy too. Mannesmann, for instance, has to deduct contributions to over 200 health insurance schemes.

Funk and Woelke would both prefer to see delinked, unpegged company pension schemes that companies can reliably cost and that are, as far as possible, out of the state's clutches.

Their priorities would be contribution-orientated and payment-related providential schemes that place greater store by staff loyalty.

"If company pension commitments are based on a fixed-sum formula," Funk says, "that isn't automatically increased by inflation and effective pay the company is in a position to react.

"If the pension scheme grows much more expensive it can temporarily cap pension increases, thereby limiting higher costs the company can no longer afford to pay."

Professor Gaugler is nonetheless convinced that company pensions will continue to hold their own. The gap between state pensions and the cost of living in retirement will in all probability widen in the decades to come.

One way companies have devised of cutting pension scheme costs is to exclude newly-hired staff from the company scheme altogether. Professor Gaugler takes a dim view of this idea.

"Successful firms will," he says, "on staff policy grounds be obliged to gradually extend company pension scheme coverage to a larger share of their staff."

Three key features must form part of new pension schemes or of amendments to existing ones, Herr Woelke feels. They are:

- Pensions must not be pegged to factors on which the company has *no influence*. They must, as far as *possible*, be removed from state influence.
- Staff loyalty must be given particular weight as an article of company policy. Length of service and value of service, arguably measurable in salary terms must have a bearing on pension commitments.
- Staff must themselves feel the pension plan is a fair deal. It must be readily understandable for staff and pensioners and easy to administer.

The state does not just take, *however*, it also offers incentives. Despite wailing and gnashing of teeth company pension schemes are still highly tax-efficient.

Tax provisions, says Cologne pension specialist Klaus Heubeck, have the effect of making "pension provisions clearly preferable, as a source of capital and in terms of return, to both outside and paid-up share capital."

He naturally feels it would be wrong to run a company pension scheme solely with fund-raising and tax efficiency in mind, however.

Leonhard Spielhofer

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 22 May 1987)



Continued from page 4

agents. In cases where modern electronic data processing is used to assist investigation methods (e.g. the "dragnet" system) this should only be done on the basis of strictly observed criteria, the judges emphasised.

It soon became clear that the judges and public prosecutors who had gathered in Hamburg were concerned about the scope of police activities and certain demands in the political field.

Superficial success-mindedness was countered by the warning to respect the basic rights of the citizen.

It was also interesting to note how the public prosecutors themselves view their own function: by no means as mere advocates of the state's security interests or a tool to be used in a power struggle.

An amendment to the law, they demanded, should make it clear that they are not political civil servants.

They also stressed that it is about time that the splendid idea of the *Rechtsstaat*, in which the sovereignty of law is the prime principle of the constitution and a verdict is only then possible if two independent institutions — the judge and the public prosecutor — regard an act as illegal, is realised. Should the judge, who has to settle conflicts between individuals and the state, be no more than the "mouth of the law" (Montesquieu)?

Is he credible if he hides his own opinion?

Some judges protest against nuclear armament via announcements in newspapers or taking part in sit-down blockades, a clear renunciation of the traditional image of the judge.

A standard code of behaviour, however, has yet to be developed.

The rather restrained majority of judges has not condemned the sit-down demonstrators at Mutlangen.

Their good intentions at any rate are acknowledged.

Scope for the free expression of one's opinion, they feel, should also exist for judges and prosecutors. The muzzling of this freedom and mealy-mouthed behaviour are unanimously rejected.

A judiciary which so openly and self-critically discusses its concerns and gears its activities to its own and the citizen's freedom deserves the trust of the public.

Werner Hill

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 31 May 1987)

■ FINANCE

Banks develop new instruments to market sovereign debts

When the largest American commercial bank, Citicorp of New York, shocked the financial world with the announcement that it was shifting $2bn into loan reserves to cover Latin American debts, financial markets would have been expected to be restless.

But after a short period of uncertainty the bank's action was welcomed rather as a "courageous step in recognising realities."

Citicorp shares were again being bought. The bank's chief executive, John Reed, promised to roll up his sleeves. By 1988 Citicorp's profits would be doubled from one billion to two billion dollars.

In the meantime America's third-largest bank, the Chase Manhattan, decided to put by $1.6bn for its South American commitments. Other American banks will make similar provisions.

Due to a different legal framework European banks have for some years quietly taken avoiding action by transferring funds to undisclosed reserves.

On the Euromarket it is estimated that by the end of this year a quarter of all "frozen" bank claims against the problem countries could be covered in balance sheets in one form or another.

Even if these expectations should be too optimistic important moves have been made for defusing the debt crisis in the creditor countries. The pressure has been reduced, time gained.

The original intention of rolling credits over by long-term debt rescheduling and at the same time injecting new funds into the debtor countries is no longer on.

Rescheduling packages came up against difficulties. The interests of the creditor banks vary widely. The smaller banks mainly do not want to join in any arrangement.

Several Latin American and African countries have to all intents and purposes ceased paying interest and servicing their debts. Negotiations with many countries have reached an impasse.

Citicorp's move was not surprising, given the bank's huge Latin American involvement and the special pressure the bank is under by having to produce quarterly results and adhere to other American legal requirements.

Internally American banks are at last

Frankfurter Allgemeine

drawing the consequences, long overdue, in their balance sheets, but externally they remain "tough."

The "secondary market" resulting from the debt crisis, in operation for some time, will be strengthened by the step Citicorp has taken.

Financial markets, always open to anything new, have taken up the challenge. They have developed systems that amount to a purchase of the old debts.

They have packaged them in a new form (bonds) and are trying to sell them to institutional groups over a wide area.

Experiments are being made with Debt Equity Swaps, which provide for the transformation of "frozen" foreign capital into equity capital.

The creditor banks transfer with discounts a part of their claim against the debtor countries.

American banks can now participate more actively in this secondary market, having written off their own claims.

Buyers will use the title to the debt, acquired by dollar payment, to purchase factories, hotels, raw materials and similar items in the debtor countries in local currency.

The American Express Group has already purchased a package of shares in the Mexican tourist industry in this way. Similarly 10 per cent of Chile's debt has been transferred into equity capital.

Fundamentally the approval of the debtor countries must be given for the transfer of these debts, and here political considerations might get in the way along the lines of colonialism through the back-door.

The debtor countries recognise that the creditor banks will insist that the situation be loosened up. For the time being the extent of this business is just a drop in the ocean, but it is a means of easing the relationships between creditors and debtor countries.

Initial steps are also being taken for the sale of bank claims in the form of bonds via international financial institutions. Title to $15bn of debt will be sold this year.

Salomon Brothers are publishing lists of problem loans from which it can be seen at what discounts loans to various countries are being negotiated.

Venezuelan loans are being negotiated at 73.5 per cent of the face value; Chilean loans at 72 per cent.

On the other hand Bolivian loans are only listed at 11 per cent of the face value, and Peruvian loans at 17 per cent.

There are rumours on the Euromarket that the Bolivians are buying back their own discounted claims on the quiet, so trying to get rid of their debts on the cheap.

The Deutsche Reichsbank tried the same thing in the 1930s, buying back frozen German foreign debt via Switzerland.

Usually only large financial groups are involved in purchasing discounted debts. Possibly the debtor countries can soon get new money, in the form of bonds, for pure commerce.

Established non-recourse export financing methods (the transfer and purchase of claims for medium-term current export exchange) could be godfather to this.

Short-term non-recourse export financing over 30 or 60 days with an above-average yield would be a splendid investment, should disbursements and repayments be kept under strict control.

There are then several ways the banks can take to deal with their credit problems and spread the remaining risks more widely.

Much criticism has been levelled at financial markets for their propensity to innovation, but in the debt crisis this flair is a welcome assistance in the situation.

Heinz Brestel

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 6 June 1987)

Bonn agrees to help bail out Warsaw

Bonn has decided to offer Poland assistance to overcome the country's increasingly serious economic and financial problems.

Economic Affairs Minister Martin Bangemann announced in Warsaw that the West German government will propose to the other 16 member countries of the Paris Club a plan to consolidate all Polish repayments that are overdue or become overdue between 1981 and the first quarter of 1988 into a general rescheduling agreement for deferment to a later date.

Herr Bangemann is confident that the other 16 creditor countries will agree to the German proposal.

He was in Poland for the seventh West German-Polish economic commission meeting he chaired jointly with Deputy Polish Premier Szalajda.

He is confident Bonn will persuade the others to agree to the proposal because West Germany is Poland's most important creditor nation.

Poland owes the 17 countries making up the Paris Club over eight billion dollars or DM18bn. Of this total DM7.9bn is owed to West Germany.

Since 1981 Poland has only been able to meet interest and repayment commitments on some of this debt. In 1981 Warsaw was unable to repay to West Germany alone DM125m. Between 1982 to 1984 this default in repayment amounted to DM438m. In 1985 repayment overdue was DM111m. To this can be added overdue repayments for 1986 and 1987.

Poland's total debts to the West is currently approximately DM33bn.

Bangemann spoke in Warsaw of a "vicious circle" for Poland. Under present conditions there was no way out for the country, he said.

In order to reduce its indebtedness Poland must export more, but Poland lacked the necessary capital to make its industrial manufactures more exportable.

According to Bangemann the only way out of this predicament was for Poland to have a number of years free of repayment commitments.

Bangemann was not prepared to say how long the period of grace for Poland should be in view of the rescheduling agreement that is being contemplated.

This grace period must be discussed by the Paris Club and the Polish government, he said.

Bangemann declined to comment on how he and his staff personally saw the current position of the Polish economy. Nor would he make any judgments on reform efforts by the Polish leadership that have been under way for a number of years.

To the question whether Poland, in five years' time and after a possible period free from repayment obligations, would be in an improved economic position, Bangemann would only say that debtors and creditors should enter into such an agreement in an optimistic spirit and with the determined will to make the arrangement work.

Poland would benefit from the fact that interest rates on international capital markets are currently very much lower than in the 1970s, when Poland incurred these debts.

In the discussions Bangemann had in Warsaw with his partner in the economic commission, Deputy Premier Szalajda, and with party chief General Jaruzelski, Prime Minister Messner and Foreign Affairs Minister Orzechowski, general matters involving West German-Polish relations were also touched upon.

"Certain irritations" that have cropped up from time to time between Bonn and Warsaw must be urgently tackled in a fundamental way, according to Bangemann. These include the systematic promotion of bilateral contacts.

These comments were understood in Warsaw to mean that Bonn was pressing for an end to the Polish propaganda campaign against the Federal Republic.

Bangemann said that for some time the Polish government had placed emphasis on direct cooperation between Polish and West German firms and schemes involving third markets.

It was a matter of some urgency that the investment agreement that is currently being negotiated between Bonn and Warsaw should be finalised.

But assurance must be given that the West German partner in cooperation agreements could transfer profits, Bangemann said.

Fundamentally, however, the West German government was in no position to "order" West German firms to participate in cooperation agreements.

Gert Baumgarten

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 28 May 1987)

■ TRANSPORT

Cycle couriers wend their way through city traffic

What, asks Kurt Wolfram, do New York, Frankfurt and Munich have in common? Rush-hour traffic jams and time-saving cycle couriers, he says.

He is the proud proprietor of the only pushbike courier service in the Bavarian capital. Five men and two women on his payroll are ready to pedal round the clock.

Couriers bike it all round the Munich suburban electric rail service area. For out-of-town destinations they first take the train, then pedal on from the city limits.

Items carried range from adapters to cylinder head gaskets — everything, to quote the service leaflet, up to a weight of 150kg.

That is the maximum even jumbo tricycles and cycle trailers can carry.

"We once took a dead cat in a cardboard box to the municipal veterinary department," Wolfram recalls. Trike passengers have also included a newly-wedded couple.

Commercial documents are the mainstay, of course. Courier Susanne has just taken on the job of collecting paperwork from Solln, a southern suburb, and running it the 10km (just over six miles) into the city centre.

No trouble, says Wolfram, and a fare of at least DM16, of which the courier pockets between six and seven.

City-centre runs are less expensive: a basic fee of DM6.50 plus 90 pfennigs per kilometre (as the crow flies).

Each courier handles six to 10 runs a day. "In the city-centre hue and cry it can be hard work," says Brigitte Weidmann, who has been with the firm for three weeks.

For her, as for most of Wolfram's staff, it is a sideline from which she cannot hope to earn more than DM1,400 to DM1,700 a month.

"In winter we use spike tyres and snow chains from Finland," Wolfram says. He launched the firm in July 1985 with "recycled" pushbikes and no end of pluck.

He now runs a fleet of new bikes, has bikes for hire and serves about 80 regular industrial and commercial customers.

"The going is tough," he says, with 600 motorised couriers in Munich alone competing with his seven bikers, soon to be followed by more in Berlin and Cologne.

Hans-Peter Buschheuer, Bavarian press officer of the Greens, the ecology party, is all in favour of using cycle couriers.

"Our party does so on ecological grounds," he says, "and because it is simply faster. Cars are a pollution menace and often get nowhere in traffic jams."

A cycle courier takes about 15 minutes to bike it from the main station to the state assembly building; it can take a car up to three quarters of an hour in rush-hour traffic.

Parking is no problem; constant accidents are. Dense city traffic can be difficult. "Harald has just had another crash," Wolfram says. "A car crossed head-on in front of him."

Harald — Harald Braun — is still with the firm. He is out distributing posters at the time of writing.


In an hour and a half he has delivered handbills to 40 addresses, including museums and theatres. As it is raining he is probably using the all-weather bike.

The all-weather bike costs over DM1,000 and has a transparent shell of glass fibre-reinforced plastic to keep rain and snow at bay.

What it cannot keep at bay is car exhaust fumes, which is why cycle couriers in New York, Frankfurt and Munich agree that: "Your cycle courier service is dust- and congestion-free, ecological, fast, noiseless and unleaded."


dpa

(Allgemeine Zeitung, Mainz, 3 June 1987)



All-weather bubble bike: keeps rain at bay but not exhaust. (Photo: dpa)

City bikes: if at first you don't succeed, try a new design



StadtRad, or city bike, is the name Pforzheim industrial design student Markus Heckhausen has given his diploma project, the latest communal pushbike scheme.

He advises local authorities to buy between 300 and 400 of his distinctive bikes per 100,000 inhabitants.

The bikes will then be spread round a limited urban area within which anyone can use them free of charge. At their destination bikers must park where they can be clearly seen. If they have just stopped en route they can operate the "in use" flag.

Otherwise the bike is there for the next user. Instructions for use are printed on the cycle frame. So is the bike's number and the telephone number of the scheme's organiser.

If a bike is seriously damaged the number is to be called so that collection can be arranged. Smaller repairs can be undertaken by authorised workshops.

Two problems, theft and vandalism, have beset all such schemes in the past. Communal bike projects have been tried, and have failed, in Amsterdam, Bremen, La Rochelle, Berne and Geneva.

Too many bikes were stolen. Too many bikes broke down too fast.

Markus Heckhausen is confident he can solve both problems. "All parts are attached by theftproof screws, nuts and bolts. They are also specially coloured (the tyres too).

So the StadtRad is immediately recognisable as communal property, just like supermarket trolleys are clearly

Free bikes: a Pforzheim design student's alternative to urban traffic jams and environmental pollution. (Photo: M. Heckhausen)

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■ AVIATION

Go-ahead for the next Airbus loss leader

Hannoversche Allgemeine

Now Bonn has agreed to invest over DM3bn in the development of two new Airbus versions the champagne is flowing in Toulouse, Munich and other Airbus production centres.

The go-ahead has been given. Bonn was under pressure after Britain and France had agreed to fund the A 330 and A 340 Airbus. Its refusal would have spiked the entire project.

Misgivings about the investment were serious, and not just in Bonn. Britain's Margaret Thatcher was long reluctant to bankroll the new models; subsidies ran counter to her free market principles.

But roughly 10,000 British jobs depend on the Airbus, so Whitehall's pledge to sink a further DM1.3bn into the Airbus was well-advised, especially in the run-up to a general election.

In France, where finance for the Airbus, a national prestige object, was never in question, the government readily earmarked DM2bn.

All concerned are well aware that development of the two new versions, the twin-jet medium-range A 330 and the four-jet, long-range, limited-capacity A 340, will be expensive.

Development costs alone are estimated at over DM5bn, and increasing opposition is voiced, especially in the Federal Republic, to successive subsidies for the European airliner project.

A government such as Chancellor Kohl's, which set out to axe subsidies, can hardly feel happy about being constantly asked to chip in.

Parliamentary state secretary Erich Riedl, in charge of aerospace coordination since early this year, recently said the Airbus had so far cost DM4.1bn in Federal budget funds.

This figure disregards a further DM3bn or so in credit guarantees. This amounted, Herr Riedl said, to DM8.76 a year per German taxpayer.

He went on to say that from 1988 the annual subsidy per taxpayer would amount to about DM40 now further subsidies had been approved.

Bonn has so far recouped virtually none of this cash and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future even though great play was made, as usual, with the refund commitment.

The Airbus consortium has to start repaying government loans as soon as break-even point is reached for the model in question. But none has yet reached it.

For the first Airbus, the A 300, break-even was supposed to be when sales reached 360. This figure has long since been forgotten.

As former Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff put it: "The break-even point streaks ahead a good deal faster than the Airbus itself will ever manage."

Asked how much of past loans had been repaid, Dieter Vogel of the Federal Economic Affairs Ministry said: "Very little."

Future refunds are even unlikelier, with the dollar's decline posing serious problems for European aircraft manufacturers.

Aircraft are paid for in dollars all over the world, whereas Airbus manufacture has to be paid for in hard Eurocurrency.

Deutsche Airbus GmbH, the wholly-owned Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm subsidiary that holds the 37.9-per-cent German Airbus stake, has already announced that if the dollar continues to coast at a low exchange rate it will run into liquidity problems and have to draw on Federal government credit guarantees.

That is why credit guarantees totalling DM1.9bn were recently converted into straight grants.

Yet the Airbus range cannot be said not to have been a market success. Sales of the A 300 have totalled 308 and of the smaller A 310 147.

The new A 320, a short- and medium-range twin-jet airliner seating 150, is not due to fly until next year, yet 439 orders have already been placed — more than for any plane before its maiden flight.

The latest versions, the A 330 and A 340, are not due for delivery until spring 1992, yet airlines have already shown interest in ordering 128 of them.

The Airbus range will then be complete, extending from a 150-seater short-range jet via a medium-range jumbo to a 250-seater long-range airliner.

The new versions will also aim at markets not otherwise catered for. Lufthansa in particular has long hankered after an airliner like the A 340.

The German flag carrier lacks a successor for the Boeing 707, which is being phased out for cost reasons on long-range services where the number of passengers does not warrant flying a jumbo.

The airline's alternative long-range model, the DC 10, is also starting to look a little long in the tooth.

Besides, many airlines would welcome a competitor for Boeing, which at present has a monopoly for long-range airliners and can dictate prices for its B 747.

The Jumbo has brought Boeing out of the red, which not even US aircraft manufacturers always manage.

For over a decade, during which 400 Boeings were sold, the US planemaker was still making a loss.

It now makes an estimated $20m profit on each 747 it sells at $135m. Boeing also made money with its previous models, the 727 and 737.

The Europeans have been nowhere near as successful yet, but the Americans are still showing signs of nerves.

The Airbus has firmly established itself in the market and has clinched many a contract Boeing had set its cap at.

The US aircraft industry regularly tours Europe to complain about the subsidies paid to its European competitors — so effectively that a transatlantic trade war was nearly declared in March.

The dispute has since been referred to a Gatt special committee and "institutionalised," to quote the Economic Affairs Ministry.

The committee is due to reconvene at the end of the month and review the latest state of affairs.

In reality both sides are in breach of the free-market spirit. The Airbus is undeniably in receipt of government subsidies, and its consortium staunchly refuses to say how much is repaid.

As the Airbus consortium does not have to issue a balance sheet no-one can check the figures.

US manufacturers in contrast make both civil and military aircraft, so it seems reasonable to assume that defence contract cash benefits the development of non-military models.

Business will grow tougher for the Airbus regardless of political clashes. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas have realised that the Europeans have found a gap in the market and aim to compete.

Boeing offers a reworked version of its fairly unsuccessful medium-range 767, while McDonnell Douglas, who had planned to phase out production of the DC-10, now intend to make a successor, the MD-11.

As the MD-11 is based on an earlier model its development costs, $1bn, are much lower than for the A 340 Airbus — and the MD-11 will be available two years earlier.

These are arguments with which McDonnell Douglas have notched up amazing successes, with 112 options already having been placed.

At Airbus the sales pitch is that an entirely new plane with the latest technology is under development — and not a revamped older model.

But the latest technology has its teething troubles. A newly-designed engine was claimed to save substantial quantities of fuel on routes served by the long-range Airbus. But this revolutionary new engine will not be ready in time.

A scale model of the A 340 Airbus, a 250-seater long-range version planned for delivery in 1992. (Photo: MBB)

This news came as a hard blow for Lufthansa executive Reinhardt Abraham, who was strongly in favour of the new airliner with its new engine and had ordered it.

Competition has made its mark on prices too. Airlines can play manufacturers off against each other to ensure rock-bottom prices.

Profits soon plummet in these circumstances, so the Airbus manufacturers have long sought alternative uses for their product: in the military sector, for instance.

An in-house report commissioned by Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm and published in March lists a number of uses: from early warning via refuelling to flying hospital aircraft.

The German Federal government has so far strictly ruled out any use of the Airbus for military purposes, arguing that the Airbus consortium was an exclusively civilian undertaking.

But a new note is now sounded. Herr Riedl said after the Cabinet had agreed to back the new Airbus models that the Airbus might conceivably be put to military use as a transport plane.

The manufacturers expect new operational areas to be more successful than the savings they are being urged to make.

Bonn Economic Affairs Minister Martin Bangemann has been particularly insistent on German Airbus companies cutting costs — but to little effect.

The politicians have also failed in another respect. They urged leading German high-tech firms to join the Airbus project via a stake in Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm. There have been no takers yet.

Aerospace coordinator Riedl, an associate of Airbus executive Franz Josef Strauss, had to admit in Bonn that the government has made scant headway.

Siemens, who already hold a 10-per-cent stake in MBB, prefer to invest in more profitable projects.

BMW is unenthusiastic about the commanding position enjoyed by Bavaria, Hamburg and Bremen at MBB. Daimler-Benz financial director Edzard Reuter frankly admits: "We have grown rich by not investing in loss-making operations."

So the outlook is gloomy where more Airbus backers are concerned, and the taxpayer will continue to have to shoulder the burden.

Herr Riedl may have called the Airbus an identification symbol of a Europe that is technologically on a par with the United States. It could also come to stand for a never-ending succession of government subsidies.

Wolfgang Gillmann

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 6 June 1987)

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what they are. Another feature is that bikes are designed to be used by men and women of all sizes and wearing ordinary clothes.

The saddle is easily adjusted, the handlebars can be handled at various heights. There is no crossbar and the chain and rear wheel are covered to keep dirt at bay.

There is a roomy luggage compartment over the front wheel. The materials used are punched sheet metal and hot-dip galvanised steel. The bikes aren't racers; they weigh 18kg, which is two to four kilos more than an ordinary tourer.

"The aim must be to get everyone to identify with the project," Heckhausen says. It would definitely improve the quality of urban life. Everyone could use city bikes if only they wanted.

Pforzheim city council is now considering a pushbike experiment. Maybe this time it will work. You never know.

Irene Brauer

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 22 May 1987)

■ EXHIBITIONS

Pleasure park of modern art is opened in Hamburg

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

Hamburg's pleasure park of modern art, *Luna Luna*, was opened over Whitsun. It is made up of 33 "projects" that have been erected in Moorweide in the very centre of the city.

The carousels turn. The ghost train and Ferris wheel attract the crowds. There are shooting galleries and shows, a hall of mirrors and a love barometer.

Appetising smells come from the stalls. The goings-on at Moorweide are like a fair-ground, an amusement park.

Responsible for it all is André Heller and he calls it "Luna Luna," recalling the Luna Park that existed in Hamburg before the war.

Heller is a devil of a fellow, a man of dreams, a singer of invective, a mimer of the melancholy, a circus romantic, a pyrotechnic poet, an impressario of valuable hot-air artistic balloons.

He said: "I recreate the dreams of my childhood." He is Austrian and he was educated by the Jesuits. His father was a candy manufacturer.

He has kept his dreams of childhood in mind. With arms flaying he told how he came upon the idea of "Luna Luna."

"After the war in austere Vienna the Prater was destroyed, like a piece of [illegible] was burnt down or destroyed. In the midst there was the Ferris wheel. It all seemed to me to promise a world of fantasy that was more worth struggling for than the so-called real world," he said.

Fifteen years ago he made his first proposals for a revival of the romantic amusement park idea. He asked why artists did not organise an amusement park when the annual fair idea is concerned with the extraordinary, the unnormal, that which tickles the fancy, that gives pleasure and excitement?

Heller does not do things by half measures. It was soon clear that he had big ideas. It would be "a world exhibition of the fantastic," a mobile work of total art of lasting value.

He has travelled the world with this idea in his baggage. His unusual idea has pleased many, but not financiers. Heller, by his own admission, needs a success, but he stubbornly goes on with his whim against all the unpleasantnesses of material existence.

He found support for his *Luna Luna* dream in a most unexpected quarter, Hamburg illustrated magazine *Neue Revue*.

With a contract in his pocket, guaranteeing him the 12 million he needs for *Luna Luna*, providing him with a chance to exploit his idea over the five years it will go on, he went looking for artists.

He did not offer a lot of money (a lump payment of DM30,000 per contract) but the chance to realise unusual projects.

The first commitment came from his native Austria. Christian Ludwig Attersee, painter, architect inventor and set-designer, provided a "ship swing with a landscape," a huge curtain surrounds the swing with a landscape and gives an idea of a very non-Hanseatic background.

Arik Brauer, painter, sculptor and architect, tells a fairytale in sculpture in his carousel.

Günther Brus designed the the six-sided "Delyrium," a booth with surrealistic dream-like adventures done by coloured pencils. Set-designer Hubert Aratym built a "changing chamber" whose peepshows reflect the visitor as king, beggar, harlequin or mistress.

Manfred Deix, who etches cartoons of the petty bourgeois, created the "Palace of Winds" in which two characters who fart display their bare bottoms through holes in the wall.

From the interior of some trees Strauss waltzes can be heard, played by Herbert von Karajan and the Berlin Philharmonic (with his approval) designed by David Hockney.

But Austria is not the world. Heller went all over the art world for his *Luna Luna*. He appealed to the stars of the modern art with charm and frankness when questions of fee were brought up. The response was considerable.

New Yorker Jean Michel Basquiat, a negro little known internationally, provided a mini Ferris wheel that turns to original music by American jazz musician Miles Davis.


Pop-art master Roy Lichtenstein provided the "Pavilion of the glass labyrinth," a hall of mirrors for which the cult composer Philip Glass wrote the music that sounds as if it came from the spheres.

French satirist Roland Topor provided the "Toporama," an eight-sided hall of horrors with peepshows in which electrically-driven figures play out scenes from the lower stratum of the conscience.

Jim Whiting, London sculptor and inventor, provided the "machine theatre," a computer-controlled scene of hell in which mechanical dolls act destructively to the sound of crazy music.

To make his who's-who of the modern world complete Heller obtained from the Spanish grand master of surrealism Salvador Dali a "Dali-Dom," a confusing dome construction, in which visitors can cast a defined shadow for the space of 30 seconds to music composed by Keith Jarrett.

German avantgardist Rebecca Horn designed the "Love thermometer." Art Deco master Erté supplied a "Mysterium Cagliastro," which includes two characters from Heller's magical theatre. The text is by Hans Magnus Enzenberger.



Versatile Viennese impresario André Heller in front of his 'Dream Station' at the *Luna Luna* show in Hamburg.

Heller himself supplied a Wedding Pavilion. He said: "Everyone can marry anyone there, without any guarantees, but with a marriage certificate." He also created the café in his air-filled balloon creation "Dream Station."

Salvador Dali provided the wall paintings for the Restaurant, designed by Vienna architect Marko Ostertag.

Heller has been able to attract 36 artists in all to his *Luna Luna*. He does not accept the criticism coming from many quarters that he has taken them in with low fees. He said that is wrong and small-minded.

"Everyone knew what he was letting himself in for. They have all enjoyed contributing. It could hardly have been done any other way, for what we have built is huge and can be built up and rebuilt for 50 years to come. Such a thing is extremely expensive," he commented.

It is not a fast-moving one-way adventure, but a dream with utility value.

Heller's magnum opus has been created. Now he has to worry about the remuneration for the work. He said: "I would rather have gone to Paris or New York. Hamburg is no place for such an extraordinary event."

There is concern about the weather as well. Torrential rain and cold hindered work on completion of *Luna Luna* in the week before the opening on June. It closes on 19 July.

And it is not only the weather that's giving Heller headaches. Admission charges are a problem. DM20 *per person* with no reductions. In the *afternoon* two children will be admitted for the price of an adult.

Heller confesses that he has transgressed against the amusement park or fair-ground principle. "I have taken the term to mean a place to which people of all social levels come out of curiosity bringing with them a great deal of their own fantasy. I have presented them there with art," he said. Is *Luna Luna* a disappointment then?

Heller's project cannot be compared with an usual annual fair. *There are* no highly expensive, huge roller coasters that give computer-controlled sensations of speed and looping the loop.

There are no pink or bright green Made-in-Hong-Kong teddy bears and no try-your-luck stalls or shooting galleries, no stalls selling drinks and Bavarian snacks, no beer tents. That could put some visitors off.

The professionals involved with the *Hamburger Dom*, the giant fair taking place three times a year with a turnover of DM40 million, are not upset. They say that *Luna Luna* has nothing to do with them.

Heller likes to point out that *Luna Luna* is "a mobile museum of contemporary art." Even that has stirred up a hornets' nest.

Indignant defenders of art *accept* that art needs something like a *fair ground* to bring it to people, but in a meaningful way.

Heller counters this with, "What is art if it is not linked to the joy of living, when it does not give sustenance to daily life. You cannot do that when art is locked away in museums."

He is supported in this by the director of Hamburg's Art Gallery, of all people, Werner Hofmann. He looked to the future and said: "Perhaps that is the museum of the future."

The Andy Warhol Memorial Pavilion shows clearly how close modern art and the fair ground idea are. Warhol once prophesied that everyone would be famous once for 15 minutes. *Luna Luna* makes that possible.

Visitors can be photographed with a polaroid camera standing with Einstein, Monroe or Marlene Dietrich.


Before *Luna Luna* goes off to other countries, addicted to out-of-this-world pleasures, the Hamburg experience will show whether Heller's carousel of mod-

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Inside the Toporama, a 'school of night visions and bad dreams' by French satirist and set designer Roland Topor.

(Photos: Peter Peitsch)



■ THE ARTS

Tucholsky death mask bequest

NÜRNBERGER Nachrichten

A death mask has brought two women together. One is 27, a housewife who lives in Passau. The other is 90. She was the mistress of a famous man and lives a thousand kilometres away in a small village near Gothenburg in Sweden.

Until a few weeks ago neither had known each other. Now the old lady has sent to the young woman her keepsake of her former friend, the death mask of the writer and satirist Kurt Tucholsky who, at 45, totally depressed at the Nazi success, committed suicide in December 1935.

There are two other copies of the mask, one in the Academy for the Fine Arts in Berlin and the other in the Literaturmuseum in Marbach.

Gertrude Meyer-Prenzlau has owned the mask for over 50 years. Museums and collectors have made approaches to her about it, but she never let it go.

In December last year she read a newspaper article and decided that Anja Rosmus-Wenninger should have it. She has two children and has been awarded the Geschwister Scholl Prize by the City of Munich.

She has collected a lot of material and written a lot about the National Socialist past of Passau and has come under much criticism for what she has written.

Her friends have said that she has knocked that to which she belongs and they have cut her dead.

For six years she has striven to get admission to the civic and episcopal archives. For weeks on end she has been getting threatening phone calls, because she dared to dig into the city's past. There are not many who want to bring back the years between 1933 and 1945.

Gertrude Prenzlau said that "she and no other shall have the mask," according to Swedish journalist Ake Williams. In December last year he wrote an article about the difficulties Anja Rosmus-Wenninger had experienced in her attempts to dig into the past.

This resulted in a pile of readers letters. Williams said: "People were indignant that such a thing should happen."

Gertrude Prenzlau was also indignant. But she would not leave it at that. She said that Anja Rosmus had rung her up and said that Tucholsky would have stood by her were he still alive. Because of this she is being given the mask, as a token of esteem and moral support.

Anja Rosmus was astounded at the offer. She said: "I am no federal president or head of state to whom such a gift would be appropriate. I could not at first believe that a lady in Sweden read an article about me and decided to give to me, totally unknown to her, the mask."

In the meantime Gertrude Meyer-Prenzlau's plan has become more clear. The death mask will be handed over to Anja Rosmus by a representative of the city of Berlin. She can do with support for her situation and that of her children has become "just bearable," but not normal since officialdom took an interest in her.

Anja Rosmus said: "Representatives of the church have already made preparations to show once more that I have lied and been careless in my research."

Church newspapers in Altötting (a stronghold of the Catholic Church) and Passau have already questioned whether her work on the late of Passau Jews during the Third Reich was worth the Geschwister Scholl Prize. These publications accuse her of not being careful enough and not having done her research properly.

These criticisms deal with minor details and her critics can be answered by the fact that secular and religious authorities have denied her access to documents.

Over the past six months Anja Rosmus has felt badly handled by the Bundespost, the postal service. She said: "Such a lot of my post goes missing that I just can't believe it is accidental. My letters get lost when they deal with the Jews in Passau. But abusive letters always get delivered."

Enquiries at the post office get nowhere. She also has trouble with her telephone. You need to be patient when you call her.

A telephone conversation is interrupted by a loud rattling, breaking off the connection for minutes on end. The crackling starts up again every two minutes.


Anja Rosmus said that the post office had not been able to find a fault, but she will not let things rest there.

She complained to the post office administration and the petitions committee of the Bavarian state parliament that the interruptions cannot be of an accidental nature.

She has the feeling that abusive callers have no trouble getting through to her and they have a clear line.

She has stored most of her files elsewhere since she was threatened on the phone that her house would be set on fire.

Naturally she is now worried for the safety of the Tucholsky death mask. "I would very much like to keep it, but



Tucholsky's death mask

(Photo: Archives)

whether I can accept the responsibility is another matter," she said.

But she does not intend to give the mask to a museum. "Frau Prenzlau was against that all her life, so I shall not do so," she said.

Gertrude Prenzlau sent her a passage that Tucholsky wrote. "There is nothing more difficult and nothing that demands more character than to find yourself in opposition and to speak out loudly. No."

Annette Ramelsberger

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 30 May 1987)

Frankfurt peace prize for philosopher Hans Jonas

DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT

Philosopher Hans Jonas has been awarded by a jury of 11 women and a man this year's German Booksellers Association Prize.

Jonas, who is 85, will be handed the award and the DM25,000 cheque that goes with it on 11 October in Frankfurt, not in the Paulskirche, as is usual (the church is being renovated), but in the Frankfurt Schauspielhaus.

The selection of Hans Jonas is timely. There is no book, before and after Chernobyl, that addresses itself effectively to the search for an ethical system in our technological civilisation than his *Das Prinzip Verantwortung*. (This book has been available in a Suhrkamp paperback since 1984.)

Hans Jonas was born in Mönchengladbach in 1903. He studied under Husserl and Heidegger, Bultmann and Harmann.

His companion at the time was Günther Anders, a year older, the author of *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen*.

He got his degree in 1923 with a thesis on *Gnosis*, (Mystical knowledge).

He had to leave Germany in 1933. Via Britain he went to Palestine where he found a teaching post at the Hebrew University.

His mother was murdered in Auschwitz in 1942. After the war he held teaching posts in Montreal, Ottawa and New York, but gnosis was the determining factor in his thought.

He sought after knowledge as well as the unity in need, belief and knowledge, natural existence and ethical duty. He sought gnosis in the past and the present.

"Prometheus Chained, to whom science attributes unknown powers and to economics untiring effort, cries out for a system of ethics that, with voluntary restraints, holds back the powers of man from being a disaster," he wrote in the first sentence of *Prinzip Verantwortung*.

After fifty years Jonas has again written in German. He decided to return to his mother tongue not on sentimental grounds but on a sober appraisal of his later years.

Hans Jonas

(Photo: dpa)

He sought "the quicker way" to express himself now that he is reaching "the limits of life and there is a sense of urgency."

Hans Jonas is a thinker who does not slip past the apparently simple childish questions in thought such as: Why must things be as they are? and Why must people be as they are?

He has given his life to considering the implications of gnosis. He does not have to trouble himself with current affairs for the specialists are no more clever than the sparrows on the rooftops and now scream at the top of their voices.

Nature gets along without man, but man cannot do without nature, he said.

Philosophy is simple and difficult, just as difficult to be tolerated in an intensified situation of irresponsible technology.

It is not just an hackneyed gesture that Hans Jonas dedicated *Das Prinzip Verantwortung* to his children, Ayalah, Jonathan and Gabrielle. He dedicated it in essence to us all.

Arnim Juhre

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 7 June 1987)

Continued from page 10

ern art has found new ways of giving a deeper and wider understanding of modern art and whether modern art can gain greater public attention.

It would seem that Heller is indifferent to the judgments made on *Luna Luna*. The more vain he is about having set up the project the more pained he is by his critics and the more he remains the enfant terrible, the radical, the guy who goes on and does things that give him a kick.

He admitted that when people did not like what he did it hurt him, but "What other people make of it is all the same to me. To say anything else would not be true."

He does not accept the criticism that he has pulled off a great bluff, that he is a charlatan with a gigantic non-starter, lacking a concept, content and sense.

He said: "The sense of my works are in fact that their existence has made possible the existence of the impossible."

He continued more sharply: "It is madness that crazy projects in armaments such as Star Wars can be put into action. That gives reality to deadly fantasies."


He said: "When my fantasies take on form, I am showing what is possible when you remain stubborn. It is worthwhile to dream."

He has one anxiety. He fears that *Luna Luna* will go the way of his "Circus Roncalli," with its nostaligic romanticism, creating a new wave, so that *Luna Luna* will be copied, but only superficially instead of being really understood.

With sad eyes Heller said "fantasyless" and suddenly that sounded like a swearword.

Hans-Jürgen Fink

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 5 June 1987)



■ SOCIETY

Divorce becomes voguish for women over 40 seeking a new lifestyle

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

Every third marriage in West Germany breaks up. Marriage advice as a result is a growth industry. There are now about 800 advice centres run by the churches and hundreds of psychologists have specialised in the subject.

They have all come across a new development: it is the increasing tendency for women to start separation proceedings as soon as the youngest child has left home. Between 25 and 30 per cent of marriages ending in family courts have lasted more than 20 years.

After years of being wives and mothers, they decide to opt for an uncertain future as their husbands look on helpless.

Take the case of Hannelore B. Her youngest daughter came home one night from an *Abitur* party and announced that the parents of a close friend had decided to end their marriage "because they don't have anything more to say to each other."

When she heard this, Hannelore B. suddenly realised that after 24 years of marriage, she and her husband were in a similar situation. Apart from conversation about their two children, there was nothing.

She and her husband, Klaus, sometimes sleep together — without talking. For years they had been parents. Now suddenly, the last thing that held them together, their daughter, was about to leave their Cologne suburban home to go and study in Berlin. What now? Klaus could not (or perhaps did not want to) see the huge vacuum that this would leave in Hannelore's existence. "You don't know how well off you are," he said as he complained about the stress in the office, the trouble at the club and the worries he had about repairing the house. What she wanted to say wasn't important.

A psychologist, Michael Möllen, who is a marriage advice counsellor for the charity organisation, Caritas, says many men are crippled when it comes to their feelings.

Cologne psychologist Erika Weiss-Weber says talking problems out is made difficult because many men have remained silent for so long about problems that the habit has become entrenched.

Many women who have had a marriage along fairly standard lines (he takes care of everything outside the home: she for children, kitchen and domestic bliss) maintain, says one family court judge, maternal feelings for the husband.

She decides not to contest every penny and wants only to get out of an arrangement that has become more of a mother-children relationship than a partnership with her husband.

In the Hannelore B. case, daughter supports mother's decision to leap into the financially difficult unknown but also into an independence which she hasn't had since the five year between first going out to work and the birth of her first child.

The husband cannot hide his pain at what is happening. His reaction before the court was a mixture of dismay and confiding something.

Afterwards, no one knows how Klaus B. came to grips with the divorce. The statistics provide something of an insight: there are many panic reactions go as far even as murder; many unexplained accidents are attributed to partner ship conflicts. Then there are the psychosomatic complaints such as allergies, asthma and stomach ulcers.

Psychologist Eva Jaeggi says this is no longer the era when people can automatically ask acquaintances they have not seen for some time how their wives or husbands are.

Over the past three years, family court judge Siegfried Willutzki has noticed an explosion in the divorce rate after 20 or 30 years of marriage. He has divorced more than 1,000 couples. It is no longer the dangerous "seven-year itch." The most dangerous times are after two years and after 20 years.

Up to 30 per cent of all divorces now occur, among couples between 40 and 50, that is among people with grown-up children and whose marriages are regarded up to this point as stable. An average sort of marriage, say lawyers as the relationship breaks up, sometimes hitting the husband like a bolt of lightning.

"I have no idea why she has done it," complained on man shortly before the silver wedding anniversary.

A 45-year-old tax department employee and father of two nearly-grown-up children said: "I have done everything for my family. I have had no affairs, I've almost always provided money and I've always tried to consider my wife's wishes. We've never really had a row." Judge Willutzki says often the man's world breaks apart.

When the divorce and separation laws were liberalised 10 years ago, the churches and conservatives warned of the consequences for housewives and mothers. The critics predicted legions of defenceless victims left floundering in the wake of untrue men taking off with younger women.

There have been cases of that, of course. But it is mainly the women who are abandoning the men. And most into financial insecurity. After so long away from work, most have minimal chances of a new start at work and about the same for a new marriage.

Psychologist Weiss-Weber found at her sessions that the men do suffer. The women, who were the first to see that there were problems with the marriage, at first sympathise with their husbands.

There are many possible explanations for the phenomenon of this late development of events. One is that people between 40 and 50 today "feel younger" than their age equivalents 20 years ago. Their attitudes are touched by confidence and the wish to have a little more freedom.

They develop feelings of reorientation after the significance of the far years with young children have ceased to be a yardstick of existence. They in a position to look around.

But the new phase is characterised by a vacuum and other features that part of a long-standing marriage.

Of course there are problems that emerge by the mere fact that a person suddenly is disgorged into a situation single-unit instead of double-unit standing, an adjustment of valency which only with a certain rearrangement tangental fundamentals be brought equidistance with the hitherto prevailing but now-departed norm.

Symbiosis is the key phrase. It is state under which no single-unit of double-unit entity was permitted to ter, develop and perfect a single personality. This is certainly what chologist Eva Jaeggi discovered.

The classic housewife marriage all the right prerequisites for this symbiosis, and as long as her children making their demands on her existence as a mother, this symbiosis is anything but regarded as a limiting factor encroaching on her own personality.

The countervailing force on this of constellation must be seen both jectively and subjectively as the introduction of an externally-oriented influence such as a career.

Weiss-Weber: "The worst declaration of love is of the sort you get in cheap romantic novels. I cannot live without you."

Such a declaration, half emotional blackmail, half an admission of personal emotional penury, does not relate to relationship between two people on the same level. On the contrary it is a declaration of a relationship like that between mother and child.

A power struggle often ensues at the end of a long relationship. Behavioural experts make a comparison with the state of puberty, through which the growing-up person is entering a process of establishing his or her identity.

Noone can really say whether after such a power struggle that a new beginning is possible or whether it signals the start of a process of dissolution. Marriage counsellors have long waiting lists, but still the queues grow. Separation or a new beginning? Both demand application of energy and cause heartbreak. Most people, psychologists too, need a long time to actually get themselves out of a collapsed, long-term relationship.

Weiss-Weber says although separation is regarded as negative, sometimes when people go their own way, an absolute end can be headed off. But not always: relationships in which people try to live differently from former generations, where such features as emancipation, independence (to this last of belongs reluctance to bother with marriage certificates and a preference for keeping own apartments) sharing work in both the domestic and career sense all contribute to the ultimate fate of the relationship.

Psychologists and domestic court judges both realise the enormous strain an ideal marriage makes upon many people. Never in any era have people been able to look forward to such a long time as a married couple.

In the good old days, death cut short marriages much like divorces today. But in spite of the increasing number of collapsed marriages, and the in- creasing number of *de facto* arrangements, more people still cannot resist getting married at least once in their life.

Marianne Quirin

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 9 May 1987)

■ FRONTIERS

Oberammergau Passion Play gets delicate text changes

Frankfurter Allgemeine

When, at the Last Supper, Jesus said to his disciples that one of them would betray him, the Apostle Jude asked: "Lord, is it I?" and Judas asked: "Master, is it I?"

At the Oberammergau Passion Play in 1990 Jude will ask, "Rabbi, is it I?" and Judas, in an underhanded manner, will ask, "Is it I, Rabbi?"

A text commission has finally made up its mind on alterations to the form of address in the script. The commission included members from the Oberammergau district council, the local Catholic priest and Protestant pastor, and two or three local advisers, including Professor Pesch, a New Testament expert.

The commission was charged with looking at the text used at the Oberammergau Passion Play for generations. A few, but influential, visitors have claimed that this text by Joseph Alois Daisenberger was anti-semitic.

In 1990 emphasis will be given to the fact that Jesus was a Jew by the frequent use of the word Rabbi.

The commission rejected the idea that Jesus should be referred to exclusively as Rabbi. They argued that this would turn a form of address into a title.

John, the third to question Jesus, will retain the old form of address: "Lord, who is it?"

Pilate will add to his traditional question to Jesus, "Am I then a Jew?" a comparison: "Am I then a Jew like you?"

Not only was Jesus a Jew but also many citizens of Jerusalem, who were inspired by him without wanting to follow him as a disciple.

The commission has conceived a new scene for the Passion Play, performed every ten years in fulfilment of a vow made by the inhabitants of the Bavarian town in 1633 during a visitation of the plague. The scene represents the argument surrounding Jesus as an internal Jewish conflict in which some of his disciples mention the duality of opinion among the people.

The reason for the death sentence passed on Jesus, hung over him at his crucifixion, is simply "Blasphemer of God." The traditional text inferred that the Man of Nazareth had to die, because he had not honoured the Sabbath and had not always obeyed the priests.

The controversial discussions between officials of the Oberammergau Passion Play and representatives from Jewish organisations about the text of the play have become so complicated that in certain instances it has become difficult to understand who wants what.

Discussions with the archbishop's palace are strictly confidential.

It has been leaked, however, that the parts of the Passion Play that are most controversial, do not involve Jesus, Judas or members of the Sanhedrim, but Pontius Pilate.

It has been proposed that he and only he should be held responsible for Christ's crucifixion. Oberammergau officials have not been able to find justification for making Pilate fully responsible in the Scriptures.

Without going into details Mayor Fend is, after putting much work into the matter, against versions of the Play that are "against Chruch tradition and which have not been approved by current Church teaching." The Gospels remain the basis for the Passion Play.

Fend continued: "The character of the Passion Play as preaching the Christian message must be preserved."

For all that no character in the Passion Play can be re-drawn more than the representative of worldly power. At first Pontius Pilate refused to have Christ crucified, although he later assented.

In the old version Pilate expresses himself unequivocally. He said: "I cannot believe that this Jesus has criminal ideas. I will not give way to the wishes of the Sanhedrim."

Last Supper at Oberammergau: a scene from the last production of the once-every-10-years Passion Play. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Instead of that he will now say: "This Jesus does not seem to me to be a dangerous man. I am still not convinced that he is guilty of a crime deserving of death."

The bold statement: "He is without guilt," has been watered down to: "I find no guilt in him."

Before a basin and water are brought in so that Pilate can demonstratively wash his hands of the affairs, he no longer says wrathfully: "You force me to give into your pressures," but he says, almost indifferently, to the servants: "They will have their way."

Mayor Fend explained that the text would be altered "as little as possible and as much as is necessary."

It seems that the commission did not think it necessary to strike out the trickiest passage. "His blood streams over us and our children."

The Oberammergau officials say that this is in St Matthew's Gospel.

They say that if anyone construes from that a collective Jewish guilt that is simply a false reading of the Bible and the Oberammergau Passion Play is not responsible for that.

There will be place found in the Passion Play programme to interpret this pronouncement as the opinion of some, not all Jews.

The proposal that Jesus should be referred to by the Jewish name Jehoshua was rejected, as was the suggestion that Jesus should pray in Hebrew during the Last Supper, so as to make clear once more that he belonged to the Jews.

The commission took the view that a prayer in Hebrew spoken by a local amateur actor would sound either comical or embarrassing.

A proposal to revise the action of the Passion Play was also rejected, the proposal that it was not the Sanhedrim that condemned Jesus to death but a small clique of traitors, who, contrary to the general enthusiasm for the Man from Galilee went along with the Romans to have Jesus killed.

Roswin Finkenzeller

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 2 June 1987)

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jects. Other priorities are small and medium-sized firms and aid to Berlin.

The German Marshall Plan Fund of the United States was endowed by the Bonn government on the 25th anniversary of Marshall Aid.

It funds research and study programmes dealing with problems of modern industrial society. It has so far received DM10m a year from the ERP special fund, and Bonn has pledged DM10m a year for a further 10 years.

George Marshall, whose name the most far-reaching and significant economic assistance programme in modern history bears, was awarded the Nobel peace prize for it.

He shared the prize with Albert Schweitzer and is probably the first general to become a Nobel peace laureate.

Werner Birkenmaier

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 6 June 1987)

Not a Christian society — not by a long shot

Unlike the Protestant Church in West Germany, the Catholic Church has been reluctant to publish statistics about religious life in a more less secular society.

But even the Catholics do not kid themseleves that West Germany is a Christian country except in only the most superficial interpretation of that term. Like the Protestants they regard the Federal Republic as a country for missionary work.

Spiritual renewal, that must be their aim, can only rely on an ever-weakening faith. Recently Cardinal Wetter of Munich remarked that even those who were closely linked to their church had very unclear ideas about the Christian faith.

According to statistics recently released for 1985 there were in this country 26.3 million Catholics and 25.3 million Protestants.

But of baptised Catholics only 6.8 million attended mass. Five years previously it had been 7.8 million.

There has been a drop of 3.5 million who attend Divine Service over the last 15 years. Three-quarters of all Catholics have only a very loose connetion with the Church.

The situation is slightly better in Bavaria. In the bishopric of Regensburg 37.6 per cent regularly attended mass. In Berlin, by comparison, it was only 13.6 per cent.

Baptised Catholics always wanted their children baptised. But with the decline in the birth rate, even among Catholics, there has been a drop in the number of children baptised.

The number of children who are not baptised, even from ordinary Catholic families, is almost five per cent higher than the percentage decline in the birth rate.

Church marriages have reached the lowest level since the war, although the children born in the baby boom years are now coming of marriageable age.

Even Catholics no longer think it necessary to get the Church's blessing on their marriage.

The number withdrawing from the Church (and the payment of the Church tax) remained at the 75,000 level, which is not as high as in the Protestant Church, which lost 140,000 members in 1985.

For the time being there is no reason to believe that things will change in either Church.

But most Catholics request to have a Catholic burial.

It is sobering for a Church that many enter life and leave it with the blessings of the Church, but the Church has little influence on people's lives.

A religious organisation cannot base itself on a "trimmed down" nucleus of believers. The Churches should spread the Gospel to all and the Church's teaching should permeate the whole of life.

Father Wilhelm Schätzler, secretary of the West German Bishop's Conference, sees the indifference to the Christian Churches in the break down of traditions, which has brought about a loss of morality in the Federal Republic.

The understanding between society and Christian tradition has dissolved over the past 20 years. That makes it difficult for the Church to get its message across.

Nevertheless the Church must ask itself if it is itself not responsible, to some extent, that Christian belief has lost its force.

The Church possibly depends too much on what can be organised, on initiative groups, work groups, on papers and explanations that provide every answer imaginable, which anyone can get from anywhere.

Protestant surveys have shown that those interested in Christianity do not turn to the Church to find what will help them in life.

They fail to find a specific Christian message. They seek the distinctive Word. But the Christian Word is no longer distinctive.

Eberhard Staub

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 22 May 1987)